	16 June 1986 her
Ta	lking Points for DDI Appearance Before HPSCI
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on	nstitution before his term ends in early 1988 and is trying to keep out front the issue. The government hopes the current special National According
est	ssion that opened on 5 June and runs until 24 June will result in the tablishment of an ad hoc interparty committee on constitutional reform.
	a presidential commission on constitutional reform is preparing a proposal for a parliamentary system, which Chun apparently prefers.
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	The schedule meets a longstanding opposition demand for a concrete political timetable. As a result, opposition leaders now risk being blamed for impeding political development if they refuse to participate in the ad hoc committee.
	The government's efforts to reach an early resolution of the constitutional
iss	ue has forced the New Korea Democratic Party to redesign its strategy.
Man pol Jons Man pol Jons Mand	Sensitive to growing public criticism of the party's seeming inflexibility, <u>Kim Young Sam</u> and NKDP President Lee Min Woo now support party participation in the committee. Although NKDP leaders are still backing direct presidential elections—the party's official position—we believe many would be willing to compromise if they believed a new government could be elected fairly.
**** (E., )	prepared to modify their call for amnesty for an alleged 1500 jailed dissidents as a precondition for forming the committee. The government's announcement last week that about 150 jailed protesters may soon be freed, followed by more next month, and negative public reaction to the increasing violence and anti-US rhetoric of more extreme dissidents have already undercut the NKDP's amnesty demand.
exoter 30	Moreover, opposition leaders recognize that continuing refusal to negotiate could give President Chun grounds for disbanding the Assembly and excluding the NKDP from new popular representations.
breal	Kim Young Sam's efforts to direct a more flexible opposition strategy has ght relations between Kim and dissident leader Kim Dae Jung to near the king point. Kim Dae Jung remains adamant that only a presidential system direct popular elections is acceptable.
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c	Radical fringe elements have also complicated the opposition's efforts to organize a united front on the constitutional reform issue.	
	The opposition is concerned about the public backlash caused by its hesitance to condemn violent antigovernment and anti-US protests, but NKDP leaders are also worried about alienating dissident students and workers.	
	Although some radical student leaders now consider the anti-American campaign a mistake, attacks on US-related facilities by splinter groups continue, including the brief takeover of the US consulate in Pusan last month and an attempted raid on the Embassy in Seoul on 8 June.	25X1
f: ne	It remains to be seen whether President Chun can balance apparent lexibility toward the political opposition with stiff measures aimed at eutralizing radical elements.	لحوض
JX X	Several ruling party moderates have told Embassy officials they believe there is only a small chance the ruling Democratic Justice Party will offer a conciliatory proposal for constitutional reform.	**************************************
acxis	The Chun government could face a strong public backlash if its proposal-as many critics anticipate-is obviously tailored to enable Chun or his close associates to monopolize power.	7 K
ور دسری کرید کرید	The ruling camp will also open itself to renewed criticism if it attempts to restrict public constitutional debate after acknowledging the popular desire for reform.	25X1
ag yez pul	President Chun faces a bumpy road ahead, and he may feel impelled to move gressively if the opposition appears to be getting the upper hand in the blic constitutional debate or if parliamentary negotiations collapse.	and.
المن المن المن المن المن المن المن المن	If the government's draft amendment falls far short of popular expectations, pressure from Kim Dae Jung would almost certainly force Kim Young Sam and other leaders to break off talks and resume the party's street campaign for direct elections.	25 <b>V</b> 1

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	Talking Points for DDI Appearance Before HPSCI	
:	South Korea: Background on Parliamentary System	
j	The presidential commission on constitutional reform and the ruling Democratic Justice Party are likely to recommend replacing the present centralized executive system with a "dual executive"or parliamentarysystem, in which a prime minister elected by and responsible to the National Assembly would act as head of government, sharing power with a president acting as head of state.	
	Both groups claim to be studying variations of the parliamentary system, but we have no information on their thinking even on such key issues as the division of authority between president and prime minister, how the prime minister would be nominated and elected, or procedures for electing the president and the National Assembly.	25
1	South Korea adopted a parliamentary system following the collapse of the lyngman Rhee government in 1960. That system, which lasted until Park Chung ee's coup in 1961, sharply curtailed the president's powers, reducing him to ittle more than a figurehead. Seats in the National Assembly were filled by opularly elected representatives, each representing a separate district.	2
s; c	It is unlikely, in our view, that the ruling camp proposal will go as far in imiting presidential powers. It is also unlikely that it will replace the resent indirect presidential elections with direct elections or substitute a ystem of single-seat legislative districts for the present system, which ombines two-seat legislative districts with the assignment of one-third of the eats on a nonelective basis.	
	Currently the party winning the most elected seats is allocated an additional 61 appointive seats, while the other major parties share another 31 appointive seats.	
	The present system has allowed the government to easily maintain a near ironclad 55-percent majority in the National Assembly based on 35-percent of the popular vote.	2